Theories often explain intra-party competition based on electoral conditions and intra-party rules. We further open this black box by considering intra-party statements of preferences. In particular, we predict that intra-party preference heterogeneity increases after electoral losses, but candidates deviating from the party's median receive fewer intra-party votes. Party members grant candidates greater leeway to accommodate competing policy demands when in government. We test our hypotheses with a new database of party congress speeches from Germany and France and use automated text classification to estimate speakers' relative preferences. The results demonstrate that speeches at party meetings provide valuable insights into actors' preferences and intra-party politics. We find evidence of a complex relationship between governing context, the economy and intra-party disagreement.
Theories of party politics often make strong assumptions about the relationship between parties' behavior and the preferences of intra-party actors. For example, scholars frequently assume that parties act as if they are unitary actors and that the party leader represents the median preferences of the party's membership.
Despite substantial theoretical development and a number of detailed case studies, few cross-national analyses of intra-party politics consider the role of intra-party preferences.
1 This absence is striking. Intra-party politics and party preferences hold implications for a large range of political processes such as election campaigns, legislative politics and coalition governance.
2
Building on these studies, we develop a theory of intra-party preferences and party leader selection by considering experiences in government and intra-party electoral rules. Broadly, we theorize that parties' electoral context influences the party's internal preference diversity. We then argue that candidates' statements of preferences influence their intra-party electoral success. Candidates that express preferences closer to the party's ideological center attract more votes than more extreme candidates.
To empirically test hypotheses from our theory, we create a new data set of intra-party actor preferences from their statements at party national congresses. By focusing on speeches at intra-party meetings, we begin to break open the black box of intra-party politics. Despite evidence that parties act as if they are internally divided in parliament, few studies seek to directly, quantitatively analyze the 1 For prominent counter examples see Laver and Shepsle 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Adams 1999; Debus and Bräuninger 2008; Kenig 2009a and 2009b , Lehrer 2012 Philippov and Rahat 2013; Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013. 2 Laver 1999; McElwain 2007; Meguid 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009; Spoon 2011; Ceron 2012 and preferences of actors outside of this arena. 3 Historically, intra-party actors'
preferences have proven complicated to measure. Limited data has created a major hurdle in testing theories of intra-party politics. We overcome this hurdle by using actors' speeches at meetings of party national congresses. Like recent research studying political documents, 4 we use automated text analysis to measure the relative location of intra-party actors' statements of preferences by analyzing their speeches at parties' congresses. We apply the scaling method WORDFISH 5 to estimate actors' ideological positions and the distance between actors within the party. This method allows us to compare actors' relative statements of preferences across multiple political settings. We then use these estimates to study the relationship between intraparty disagreement and experiences in government and elections. In a second analysis, we predict party leadership elections at national congresses from the relative location of speakers' preferences.
The results from our analysis are consistent with an explanation of intra-party politics focused on the party's internal rules and electoral context. Likewise, the results indicate that our measures provide meaningful estimates of the location of intra-party actors' preferences that can be adapted to fit numerous research goals.
More broadly, we find evidence of a complex relationship between parties' electoral performance, experiences in government and intra-party division.
In the following section, we discuss previous studies of intra-party politics and leadership selection before considering previous approaches to studying actors' preferences. We then describe the role of party congresses in political party behavior and outline our empirically testable hypotheses predicting two dependent variables: 3 see Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013 or Ceron 2012 for prominent counter-examples. 4 Slapin and Proksch 2008; Ceron 2012 and Proksch and Slapin 2012. 5 Slapin and Proksch 2008. intra-party division and party leadership selection. Following a discussion of our data collection and approach, we illustrate differences in parties' disagreement over time and show how the positions of individual party actors are linked to leadership selections at the parties' national congresses. The results from both sets of analyses provide important insights into the study of political party behavior and offer a new approach for scholars to understand and measure intra-party actors' statements of preferences.
PERSPECTIVES ON INTRA-PARTY POLITICS
Researchers show that political parties' preferences are important for understanding electoral behavior and government outcomes. Little consensus exists surrounding the intra-party process that yields parties' statements of preferences such as election manifestos. Scholars have previously considered intra-party politics from spatial or organizational perspectives.
Many studies from a spatial perspective assume that party leaders represent the median preferences within the party or that the leaders' preferences exemplify the broader organization's goals. 6 The relative location of parties' statements of preferences is frequently considered to be strategically chosen or selectively emphasized to maximize the votes the party receives in an election. 7 They argue that parties selectively emphasize their preferences to attract voters who in return select parties which they expect will be most likely to implement their policy goals. Huber 1996; Hug and Schulz 2007; Carrubba et al. 2008; Clinton and Lapinski 2008; Ceron 2013. 13 Bernauer and Bräuninger 2009; Proksh and Slapin 2012. 14 McCubbins 1993 and Huber 1996; Döring 2003; Ceron 2013 . 15 Huber 1996 Rosas and Shomer 2008. 16 Bowler et al. 1999; Laver 1999; Carey 2009; Kam 2009 . 17 McElwain 2007 Meguid 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009; Ceron 2012 and Scholars assume party leaders generally receive the support from large majorities of intra-party supporters, but internal party competitors may be able to mobilize the support of groups with diverse political interests within the party. Modern, catch-all parties frequently assemble diverse political supporters, each of which would prefer their policy goals as the party's priority.
18
Scholars of party organizations instead study intra-party politics through the lens of internal institutional rules. These studies show that intra-party organizational characteristics such as the method of leadership selection, changes in party memberships and change in factional dominance influence parties' statements of preferences. 19 For example, Harmel and Janda theorize that party leadership selection and factional dominance influence the party's preferences. 20 Under contexts that lead to changes in leadership and the dominant faction, such as large electoral losses or exogenous shocks, the party's message also likely changes. 21 Kitschelt adds that experiences in government and electoral results influence the composition of parties' membership and that this eventually impacts the long term direction of the leadership. 22 However, dynamics in numerous democracies have caused parties to rely less on their memberships for running electoral campaigns. As a consequence, parties have become more hierarchically organized. 23 Furthermore, parties that provide greater influence to party members and voters in leadership selection attract 18 Kirchheimer 1990. 19 Ceron 2012. 20 Harmel and Janda 1994.
21 Janda et al. 1994; Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003; Hazan and Rahat 2006; Kenig 2009b . 22 Kitschelt 1989. 7 a larger number of candidates for office, but fewer intra-party candidates receive most of the votes.
24
Both spatial and organizational perspectives have given us substantial insights into preferences and party politics. Little research from either perspective, however, directly studies the causes and consequences of intra-party preference heterogeneity.
In the following sections, we propose a theory linking the range of intra-party preferences to their electoral context and consider the implications of intra-party preferences for party leadership selection.
THE CAUSES OF INTRA-PARTY HETEROGENEITY
Intra-party preference heterogeneity holds important implications for a range of political outcomes. Studying its causes will allow us to better understand the decision-making process leading to parties' election and policy behavior. In general, we propose that the party's electoral and governmental performance influences intraparty politics.
Like previous research on party change, 25 we expect that there are numerous factors that likely influence intra-party politics and the information party leaders have about the distribution of preferences within the party. Scholars have theorized that major events, such as elections or losing government positions will alter parties' internal composition and rules. Kitschelt suggests that experience in government and previous electoral results influence the types of activists, supporters and politicians that join parties. 26 Similarly, Przeworski and Sprague find that Socialist parties' internal organizational structures became more hierarchical as they gained 24 Kenig 2009b. 25 Harmel and Janda 1994. 8 experience in office. 27 Harmel and Janda add that major electoral defeats provide the opportunity for changes in factional dominance.
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Building on these studies, we predict electoral success and experience in government influence intra-party politics. Parties that are electorally successful likely attract more pragmatic supporters hoping to benefit from the party's access to government. 29 So long as the party's leadership maintains electoral support, intraparty competitors will bandwagon or link themselves to the leaders' reputations to curry favor with the leader and groups within the party. Due to this pragmatic bandwagon behavior, intra-party disagreements are likely to be limited when the leadership attracts sufficient electoral support for the party.
However, competition between groups within the party increases when one faction or group sees an opportunity to expand its influence. Following electoral defeat, intra-party groups place the blame on the dominant party leaders and factions for these losses. 30 To clearly distinguish themselves from the previous leader's reputation, challengers arise within the party who offer distinct alternatives from the current leader's preferences. Large electoral defeats lead groups to challenge the party leaders' preferences to differentiate themselves from the parties' previous direction. This logic leads us to our first hypothesis that predicts intra-party disagreement increases in response to electoral loss.
H1) Electoral losses increase intra-party disagreement.
27 Przeworski and Sprague 1986. 28 Harmel and Janda 1994 . 29 Kitschelt 1989 . 30 Harmel and Janda 1994.
Furthermore, we add that parties' experience in government influences intraparty heterogeneity. The longer a party stays in office, the higher the likelihood that a world event or crisis occurs that forces leaders to make unpopular policy decisions.
31
Parties with long term successes in government become filled with actors with more disparate and pragmatic policy goals, 32 but they stick with the party leader because their primary interest is to stay in power. Furthermore, economic conditions and coalition governance encourages compromises on a diverse set of policies.
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Perceptions of government accountability and competence may influence the intraparty distribution of preferences and factional dominance. Negative evaluations of the party's leadership also encourage challenges to the party's direction.
Like studies of economic voting, we assume that voters hold parties accountable for the economy. 34 As the most salient topic and ideological cleavage in most modern democracies, the economy provides a clear measure of the government's success. We argue that party members and intra-party challengers also use the economy to evaluate the party's competencies and popularity. Challengers are unlikely to distinguish themselves from the current leadership when the party is perceived to be performing well. 35 On the other hand, intra-party groups will express their discontent with the party's direction when the public perceives the party as incompetent or unaccountable. 
H2a) In the opposition, positive economic performance increases intra-party disagreement.

H2b) In government, poor economic performance does not increase intraparty disagreement.
In general, we predict that intra-party disagreement increases when the party is perceived to have failed, but rallies around party leaders when they are in government. In particular we predict that perceptions of incompetence among party members develop when a party has just lost an election or for opposition parties when the sitting government benefits from a strong economy. Building on this 40 Green and Jennings 2012a and 2012b.
approach, we argue in the next section that the outcome of party leadership elections depends on these statements of preferences as well as their broader election context.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERGENT PREFERENCES
We theorize that the causes of intra-party preference heterogeneity are linked to parties' experience in government. The consequences of divergent intra-party preferences also hold important implications for parties' leaderships. Building on both the spatial and organizational perspectives, we theorize that political parties are dynamic organizations. As organizations, the parties' leaderships depend on the support of intra-party groups to stay in power. 42 Recent reforms that increased intraparty democratization over the party's leadership selection, however, decreased the degree of internal competition. More candidates compete, but fewer candidates perform well. 43 Like parliaments and other organizations, we expect that the internal distribution of preferences influences internal votes for the party's leadership and outputs.
Spatial theories assume that party leaders will hold preferences somewhere close to the party's median position. 44 We expect that the rules for selecting leaders likely influence the specific leaders chosen and leaders' incentives for making statements of preferences. 45 Although the rules for selecting party leaders differ 42 Harmel and Janda 1994. 43 Kenig 2009b.
44 Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002. 45 Innovative research by Kenig (2009a and 2009b) Kitschelt (1989) argues that opposition parties attract more ideologically rigid activists, while government parties attract more pragmatic activists, seeking incremental changes. different intra-party groups express a wider range of preferences. Consequently, uncertainty about the distribution of intra-party preferences also increases.
Therefore, change in party leaders and broad preferences occur as the median intraparty voter is revealed and chooses between diverse competitors in the opposition.
More broadly, intra-party demands for specific policy goals may therefore explain broad differences in parties' electoral campaign tactics when they are in the government versus the opposition. 59 Based on this logic, we predict in our final hypothesis that ideological proximity to the party median matters more for candidates from an opposition party than for candidates whose party is in government.
H4) Government participation moderates the effect of candidate statements of preference. Ideological distance from the party center decreases support for
candidates in opposition parties more than for government parties.
In summary, we argue that the causes and consequences of intra-party preferences are driven by parties' electoral context and governmental role. More broadly, we think that intra-party factions and party members use speeches at party congresses to signal their internal strength and the location of their ideal preferences.
Individual party members speak to signal their preferences and therefore pull leaders' statements of preferences towards their own. Although, in some countries, party leaders control who speaks at party congresses, party delegates from France and Germany are free to participate at the party meetings because the party leadership 59 Greene 2014. seeks to avoid excluding supportive groups. 60 From this perspective, diverse groups within the party send representatives to speak on their behalf at party congresses.
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Therefore, these speeches closely approximate the preferences of the delegates at these meetings and the preferences of the party membership more broadly. In the next section, we describe our new data set and method of deriving positions from intra-party speech.
DATA AND METHODS
To test our hypotheses, we collect data on intra-party leadership elections and In our sample, we find no obvious cases where intra-party factional groups are excluded from the parties. Delegates are chosen in the PS as representatives of the regional party organizations. In Germany, delegates represent are also chosen by regional organizations. In each case, there are few practical limitations on the parties' rules for limiting speaking rights. 61 The selectorate for candidate and leadership elections depends on parties' rules. While many parties are democratizing their rules to increase the groups participating in these elections, the parties in our sample give this responsibility to the party's membership through their delegates at national meetings.
For more information about the diversity of parties' selection rules see Kenig 2009b .
62 Harmel and Tan 2003; Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005. the primary authority for selecting candidates is the party membership. 63 These similarities mean that our results are likely to hold for parties with comparable organizations and histories elsewhere.
Despite these similarities, the parties also hold a large number of differences.
These dissimilarities allow us to test our hypotheses using the logic of a most different systems research design. 64 In particular, the CDU and the UMP tend to hold more conservative ideologies whereas the SPD and the PS both hold social democratic values. The ideologies of the conservative and the social democratic parties diverge and represent different historical constituencies. 65 Broadly, the French and German parties also compete in largely different electoral and institutional frameworks. Germany is a federal, parliamentary system with a mixed-memberproportional election rule while France is a unitary, semi-presidential system with a two-round runoff voting rule. 66 Therefore, if we find evidence that our approach fits our theory for the parties then we can be somewhat confident that the differences between the systems do not contradict our theoretical approach. 63 The rules for the selection of the party leadership are formulated in the parties' standing orders.
Although, the standing orders have frequently been adapted over the last decades, the authority for selecting the party leadership has remained unchanged. The current rules for the CDU 70 A lack of full transcripts of speeches in any format greatly limits our potential sample.
71 Slapin and Proksch 2008. 72 The model can implemented in the statistical programming language R using the package Austin developed by Will Lowe (2011) .
The parameter λ is the mean and the variance of the distribution and takes the following functional form:
where α are a set of text fixed effects controlling for the length of the document, ψ is a set of word fixed effects controlling for words that are generally used more frequently than others, β is an estimate of the word specific weight capturing the importance of word j in discriminating between policy positions, and ω is the estimate of the speaker i's policy position. We are interested in the latter two parameters. To identify the model, both α and the mean of all speaker positions is set to 0 and the standard deviation is set to 1.
In contrast to other scaling approaches such as WORDSCORES,
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WORDFISH does not require reference documents with known positions on predefined policy dimensions. It only requires that the documents used in the analysis reflect the authors' policy position on a single dimension. We estimate separate models for each party and each party congress using all meaningful speeches as data. We therefore expect that the dimension underlying the data corresponds to a basic left-right policy dimension. 74 Before we scale the documents we prepare the data by removing stop words, numbers, punctuation and words that appear in nearly all of the documents. We also apply the German and French Porter stemming algorithm to reduce words to their word stems.
73 Laver et al. 2003. 74 Given our interest in the relative location and distance from the median position for each congress, Like the example presented in Figure 1 , we estimate separate WORDFISH models for each national congress. We then test our first and second hypotheses using a measure of intra-party disagreement based on the WORDFISH estimates. In particular, to determine whether intra-party disagreement increases after parties suffer electoral losses for government positions we calculate the total variance of actors' preferences for each national congress. We then use this variance as the dependent variable in our second analysis.
The primary independent variables predicting intra-party heterogeneity are electoral success, government experience, and economic conditions. We operationalize electoral success as the change in the percentage vote the party received in the following national parliamentary elections. We also include the percentage vote for presidential elections in France (treating this variable as zero for German parties). Similarly, we operationalize experience in government using a dummy variable indicating whether the party is part of the governing cabinet or controls the presidency in France (treating this variable as zero for German parties).
We then include an interaction of government incumbency with the change in annual GDP growth from the OECD. Because the French parties, the PS and the UMP, vote for a slate of candidates or a "motion", rather than for a candidate, we use the total percentage of votes that each motion received during a national congress. Each motion includes a series of policy proposals for the platform and a list of leaders. For each motion, we identify the main initiator and future party leader and add the total percentage of votes that the motion received.
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We use the percentage votes for the candidates for the German parties and for each motion submitted in the French parties as the dependent variable in our second set of analyses. We then use our WORDFISH estimates to create a distance measure by calculating the absolute distance between the position of each candidate (initiator) and the median position of speakers at each party congress. 79 We also include some controls that have been found to be important in studies of electoral politics. We include dummy variables for whether the speaker has held the office before for the German parties and a dummy variable for each type of leadership position. We also include a dummy variable for the candidates' gender to account for the party's gender quota requiring that one third of the board be female. We then include a dummy variable for the PS and UMP if the motion is supported by the current party leader.
ANALYSIS I: INTRA-PARTY DISAGREEMENT
78 For most motions this is easy because they are generally referred to by the initiator of the motion that will be the new party leader if the motion is successful. 79 Our results are robust to using the mean or median position.
Our first hypotheses predict that intra-party disagreement increases with electoral losses and parties' experience in the opposition. The results from our analysis indicate support for the hypotheses, although the total number of party congresses limits our ability to perform extensive regression analysis for any individual party. As a preliminary demonstration of our theory, we present graphical evidence for each party. To directly test the first set of hypotheses, we predict the amount of variance at party national congresses based on the parties' experience in government. We first conduct separate analyses before testing the relationship in a combined model.
Despite the small number of observations (24, 12, and 19) , our analyses yield evidence consistent with our theory.
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In the first hypothesis, we predict that intra-party disagreement increases after an electoral loss. Despite the descriptive evidence, Table 1 shows only weak support for this hypothesis. For the German parties and the combined analysis in Table 1, having lost control of government leads to an increase in disagreement, but the coefficient is only significant for the SPD in Model 2. The coefficient is in the wrong direction for the PS. The coefficient for the change in the percent parliamentary vote the parties receive is in the correct direction for the CDU, the PS and in the Combined model, but is in the wrong direction and significant for the SPD. The 82 Due to the small number of observations, direct interpretation of the significance for the individual party tests should be treated with caution. We also include the estimates for the one party congress from the UMP in Model 4. Excluding the UMP leads to substantively similar inferences. We demonstrate somewhat stronger evidence in support of the second hypothesis in Table 1 . In particular, we argue that the economy influences the internal politics of parties, particularly when they are in the opposition (H2a). The coefficients for the interaction of change in percent GDP growth and the party's government status are in the expected direction for the SPD, PS and the Combined models, and statistically significant for the SPD and the Combined test. Importantly, the constitutive term for change in percent GDP growth is positive in these models; opposition parties face increased disagreement under stronger economic growth. The magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction suggests that government parties may decrease their internal disagreement as the economy grows, but the combined effect does not reach statistical significance. This evidence is consistent with our prediction for government parties in our second hypothesis (H2b). The solid line in Figure 5 is the median predicted intra-party disagreement. The dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals based on simulations using 1,000 draws from the estimated variancecovariance matrix from Model 4 in Table 1 . Values for the independent variables are set such that the predicted effects are for an opposition party that has not changed its vote or government status in the Figure 5 illustrates the effect of economic growth. As the rate of growth increases for opposition parties, intra-party disagreement increases. An increase of one standard deviation in percent GDP Growth increases disagreement by .255 or a 16% increase to the mean level of disagreement. This increase likely reflects infighting over control of the party when the leaders expect the party to perform poorly. Disagreement arises when intra-party groups believe that the current leadership is performing poorly. In summary, these results suggest that electoral success may cause parties to act more coherently, but that opposition parties divide when they perceive their current leadership to have failed. This evidence is consistent with our second hypothesis.
ANALYSIS II: IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY AND LEADERSHIP
SELECTION
According to hypotheses H3 and H4, candidates for the party leadership will gain more votes from intra-party groups when they are more ideologically central, but that ideological distance is less important with the party is in government. To test these hypotheses, we run separate regression analyses using Ordinary Least Squares regression with robust standard errors for each party first and then in a combined model with random effects that we present in Table 2. 86 last election. The dotted line in is the distribution of change in GDP growth rate and refers to the right hand side axis. 86 We include random effects to account for differences between party congresses. We find substantively similar results using fixed effects, or cluster the standard errors using the party congress as the id variable. The results in Table 2 indicate some support for the theory. In particular, ideological distance is in the correct direction for most of the models. Consistent with our third hypothesis (H3), we find that greater ideological distance from the party's ideological center will lead candidates to receive a smaller percentage of the vote. In particular, the coefficients are negative and significant for the SPD and the PS as well as in the full sample in Model 8. Furthermore, the effect of ideological distance depends on the party's status in government, as the fourth hypothesis (H4) predicts. Consistent with our theory, the coefficient for the interaction of government status and distance is positive in three of the models and significant for the SPD and the full sample. This indicates that ideological distance has a different effect for parties in government. Participation in government causes the effect of distance to disappear as the combined coefficients are no longer significant. As the second hypothesis predicts, candidates in government parties are insulated from the negative effects of their statements. draws from the estimated variance-covariance matrix from Model 6 in Table 2 . Values for the independent variables are set such that the predicted effects are for a first time female candidate running for a position on the SPD Extended Board that is not a member of parliament when the party is in the opposition. The dotted line is the density of candidate distances and refers to the right hand side axis. We present this effect graphically in Figure 6 for candidates in the SPD when it is in the opposition. The graph shows that more ideologically distance candidates gain fewer votes than more central candidates. In particular, a decrease of one standard deviation in ideological distance increases the candidate's vote by nearly 4 percent for candidates in the SPD when it is in the opposition.
The control variables in the first set of analyses are mostly in the predicted directions. Men hold an advantage in the PS, but not in the German parties. The difference between these parties may be unsurprising since France only adopted quota laws in 2000. 88 Incumbent candidates earn more support than non-incumbents.
Members of parliament also benefit from their position in office in the PS and the CDU, but not the SPD, although the coefficient is never significant. Finally, the dummy variables for the position type also suggest that candidates for lower level positions in the German parties gain a smaller percentage of votes than the candidates for the top leadership position.
CONCLUSIONS
The results from our analysis provide support for our hypotheses on intraparty politics. Using speeches at party national congresses to measure the preferences of intra-party actors, we find that party leaders with more divergent preferences attract less support from intra-party elections in the SPD and the PS, but more support in the CDU. However, party leaders are generally isolated or protected from their statements when the party participates in government. These results hold up in a pooled analysis with additional data from the UMP. Parties' experiences in government also influence the range of disagreement, although there is at best 88 O'Brien 2010 and limited evidence that electoral losses increase intra-party disagreements. Instead, disagreements arise most strongly when opposition parties are perceived as incompetent or unaccountable such as when economic growth increases.
Our analysis provides supportive evidence for numerous studies of party politics. In particular, while party leaders' preferences may be closer to the party's median position, intra-party preferences vary greatly and systematically, depending on the party's experience in government. As mounting research shows, 89 scholars should be wary of assuming that this intra-party preference variation does not influence the party's election and governmental behavior. Intra-party heterogeneity likely influences the degree of cohesion between the party's leaders and their ability to negotiate with potential coalition partners or on policy agreements. Our analysis of intra-party disagreement also provides researchers with a mechanism to study the effect of rules on parties' parliamentary discipline by indicating the extent to which members act cohesively at the intra-party level. By systematically studying intraparty elections we show one way in which intra-party groups may be able to resolve their disputes, through votes at national congresses.
Despite the small number of party congresses and the large ideological and institutional differences between the German and French parties, our results demonstrate that speeches at party national congresses provide useful information about the relative location of actors' preferences. Our approach provides a more direct means of measuring actors' preferences based on their own statements in a setting that is distinct from their behavior in office. However, we caution scholars against making overly large generalizations from our limited sample. Our case selection included parties competing in widely different institutional settings, but 89 See for example Kenig 2009b; Ceron 2012; Lehrer 2012. there are also a number of similarities in the German and French parties which limit the external validity of our study. We are uncertain whether parties with different organizations or which have never participated in government act in similar ways.
Also, alternate national or intra-party electoral rules might lead to different outcomes. We expect that future analyses would benefit greatly from the systematic collection and analysis of party congresses in a comparative, cross-national framework. By analyzing intra-party politics we hope to break open the black box of intra-party politics and gain deeper insights into the political process. Using these estimates, we hope that scholars of parliamentary behavior and public policy will be able to improve their ability to predict a wide range of behaviors and outcomes, such as coalition formation and termination, the number and type of public policies, and government oversight behaviors, without the fear that their estimates are endogenous to the processes they are seeking to study.
